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Abstract
Honeypot is a decoy system with vulnerabilities introduced to trap hackers. Through
many years of evolution, a generation of smart honeypots has been developed. The self-
adaptive honeypot is a smart honeypot that is expected to respond appropriately to the
attacker’s request. In most existing self-adaptive honeypot systems, the commands sent
from the attacker play a central role in the reasoning process of the honeypot. In this
thesis, we focus on the construction of a machine learning workflow that aims at esti-
mating the risk level of these commands. Experiments show that the proposed workflow
achieves potential results.
Résumé
Honeypot est un système leurre avec des vulnérabilités introduites pour piéger les at-
taquants. Au cours de nombreuses années d’évolution, une génération de honeypots
intelligents a été développée. Le self-adaptive honeypot est un honeypot intelligent qui
devrait répondre de manière appropriée à la demande de l’attaquant. Dans la plupart des
systèmes de self-adaptive honeypots existants, les commandes envoyées par l’attaquant
jouent un rôle central dans le processus de raisonnement du honeypot. Ce mémoire se
concentre sur la conception d’un workflow d’apprentissage automatique qui vise à es-
timer le niveau de risque de ces commandes d’entrée. Les expériences montrent que le
workflow proposé produit des résultats potentiels.
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This project aims at defining a solution to estimate the risk level of the Linux commands
that are sent from the attackers to the SSH honeypots. In the following section, the con-
text and motivation will be explained. An preliminary analysis of the problem will be
presented and the research questions will be identified in Sec. 1.2. An overview of the
solution and the contributions of this thesis will finally be presented in Sec. 1.3
1.1 Context and Motivation
With the global spread of internet and the very fast development of technologies, more
and more organisations digitize their business systems and connect them to the internet.
This introduces new opportunities to our society and to the organisations themselves, but
also new related risks. Security is always a great challenge that every organisation has to
care about. While traditional methods such as IDS system or penetration testing can help
secure the network, it should aware that vulnerabilities can still exist, and can be exploited
at any time. Also, hackers never sit still. New methods and tactics to attack networks
are developed day by day along with the development of the technologies. Thus, it is
necessary to continuously study the attacks and find innovative ways of countering the
threats. Honeypot is one of the techniques that serve these purposes.
Being studied since the late 80’s, honeypots are decoy systems with intentionally in-
troduced vulnerabilities that are deployed with the intent of attracting the hackers. In [3],
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Cheswick told an interesting story about ”a merry chase” of a cracker who fell into a trap
system with fake services installed. In the literature, Cheswick’s system is considered the
first honeypot. Since then, the honeypots become more and more popular. Different hon-
eypot systems have been developed for various purposes. However, the hackers don’t
sit still! They learn to detect the honeypots by studying the characteristics of different
aspects in the target system: file system, available tools and running services, and the be-
haviour of the interaction such as the response time, the response content and format, etc.
This is a long brain teaser game between the hackers and the administrators. To counter
the hackers, a generation of smart honeypots, called self-adaptive honeypots, have been
introduced.
As will be discussed in the chapter 2, self-adaptive honeypots are expected to respond
appropriately to the attacker’s input commands so that they can avoid being finger-
printed. At the same time, the underlying target system, if exists, must still be protected.
In most existing self-adaptive honeypot systems, the commands sent from the attacker
play a central role in determining the action to be taken, no matter what algorithm is
applied in the learning process. Moreover, the input commands may have a direct im-
pact on the underlying system in the high-interactive honeypots. Integrating a module to
measure the risk of these commands may help these honeypots work smarter and protect
their underlying environment when deal with dangerous inputs.
In this master thesis, the problem of automatically estimating the risk level of the Linux
commands sent from the attackers to a honeypot is addressed. This work is conducted in
the context of a master internship, which is a small support part of the ongoing doctoral
project of Mr. Touch at the university of Namur. Inspired by the existing works about
self-adaptive honeypots, Mr. Touch proposes a new conceptual architecture of Smart
Honeypot. The core of this system is a Smart Proxy which contains a decision maker. The
input commands and environmental information are used as the base to decide the action
to be taken in return to the attacker’s request. The internship is realized with the hope
that the commands’ risk level could be a useful supplementary information that helps
augment the efficiency of the decision maker.
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In the next section, a preliminary analysis of the problem and the identified research
questions will be presented.
1.2 Preliminary analysis and research questions
The objective of this work is to construct a machine learning workflow which can estimate
the risk level of a Linux command.
The problem of estimating the risk is in fact a prediction problem: given a Linux com-
mand, we need to predict its risk level. This is a supervised learning problem which
required labeled data for training and testing purposes. During the internship, a set
of honeypot data is provided. These data were recorded from two medium-interaction
SSH honeypots which were configured and deployed by Mr. Touch . The sequences of
command lines are then extracted from the data and grouped by SSH sessions to form a
dataset. However, the available data are not yet labeled. A supplementary task is neces-
sary: We need to estimate and assign the risk level for each command in the dataset.
By analyzing the problem and the available data, we identify four research questions:
• RQ1: The available data are in form of text sequences. However, machine learning
algorithm requires numerical feature vectors. How to represent the text commands
efficiently to use in machine learning algorithms?
• RQ2: Assigning the risk level to a command is a task that requires professional
knowledge, including the understanding about the effect of the command and the
ability to measure severity of that effect. This is a time-consuming task. Is there a
way to label the data with a minimal human effort?
• RQ3: Which machine learning model will be appropriate for this task? Obviously,
the most important criterion for choosing a model is its prediction performance.
In addition, the prediction time should be as low as possible. Knowing that the
model is for an interactive system: the attacker sends a command and waits for the
response from the honeypot, the response time is very important.
• RQ4: In the security environment, bad predictions may be harmful. Which metric
will be appropriate to measure different criteria of the system?
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To tackle the problem, we firstly solve the simple case in which only 2 risk levels are
defined: normal/benign (0) and risky/malicious (1). In this case, the problem becomes a
binary classification problem. The general case with multiple risk levels is then addressed
in form of a multi-class classification problem.
1.3 Principal Contributions
The main contribution of this work is the construction of a complete machine learning
workflow to solve the problem of classifying the commands by risk levels. Through this
workflow, all the research questions are addressed. This workflow consists of differ-
ent phases: data collection and labeling (RQ1), data cleaning and pre-processing, data
transformation (RQ2), model construction(RQ3), evaluation and interpretation of the
predicted results (RQ4).
The original problem is considered in two cases. Firstly, we deal with the simple case
where only two risk levels are defined: normal/benign (0) and risky/malicious (1). The
problem is formulated as a binary classification problem. For this case, we focus on study-
ing how to transform the text data into the numerical vectors. Our contribution here is to
find out a good representation model for the Linux commands. By evaluating different
representation models, we progressively improve the performance of the binary classifi-
cation task. Our experiments show that the Doc2Vec model gives the best performance,
we achieve a 97% accuracy on the test set of our data.
Secondly, we tackle the general case where multiple risk levels can be defined. This
case is formulated as a multi-class classification problem. To label the dataset, we have to
construct a model to automatically estimate the risk level. The contribution in this step
is our solution of applying a novel Labeling Model to automatically estimate the risk level
of the unlabeled commands. The basic idea is to take into account the weak supervision
information such as the heuristic or the experts’ knowledge about the Linux commands
to describe how to estimate the risk level in a programmatic way. With the 5 estimated
risk levels produced by the Labeling model, we achieved 99% accuracy on the test set.
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This thesis is organized as follows:
Chap. 2 defines some background terms and summaries some related works.
Chap. 3 presents our proposed solution for the problem of classifying the commands
in SSH session by multiple risk levels. Two workflows are introduced in Sec. 3.1 and
Sec. 3.2, corresponding to the two case of the problem (the simple case with 2 risk levels,
and the general case). In Sec. 3.3, the choice of evaluation metric will be discussed.
Chap. 4 presents the details of the workflow to classify the commands in the simple
case (only 2 risk levels are identified: normal and malicious (risky)).
Chap. 5 presents the details of the workflow to classify the commands in the general
case where multiple risk levels could be identified.
Finally, Chap. 6 discusses more about the non-functional requirements of our system
such as the quick response time, the ability of maintenance and the interpretability of the
prediction results. We also discuss the points to improve in the future work, particularly
how to take advantage of the Labeling Model to infer more reliable label for the unlabeled




Background and related works
In this chapter, an overview of the honeypots and self-adaptive honeypots will be pre-
sented in Sec. 2.1. Next, the terms “risk” and “risk level” which are the key words in the
problem statement will be discussed in Sec. 2.2. Finally, some existing works related to
the analysis of user commands will be summarized in Sec. 2.3.
2.1 Honeypots and Self-Adaptive Honeypots
2.1.1 Honeypots
The concept of honeypots has been introduced since the early 90’s but the term honeypot
was only introduced for the first time in 2002 by Lance Spitzner [36]. Since then, sev-
eral authors proposed different definitions for this term. In 2003, Fabien Pouget et al [25]
offered a survey of the literature and introduced an intuitive definition: A honeypot con-
sists in an environment where vulnerabilities have been deliberately introduced in
order to observe intrusions.
The value of the honeypots relies in getting hacked. In industries, the honeypots are
often deployed alongside the production systems. The intent of this strategy is to trick
the hackers into hacking the decoy systems. The general purpose of honeypots is to make
the attacker believe that he is interacting with a real machine. If this purpose is achieved,
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this will allow the administrator to observe the behaviours of the attackers, then to guard
against new attacks.
There are many ways to build and deploy a honeypot. To distinguish different types
of honeypots, we can classify them by the level of interaction that they afford to attackers.
The level of interaction gives us a scale with which to measure and compare honeypots.
According to Spitzner [36], the more a honeypot can do and the more an attacker can do
to a honeypot, the greater the information that can be derived from it. However, by the
same token, the more an attacker can do to the honeypot, the more potential damage an
attacker can do.
The honeypots are grouped into three interaction categories:
• Low-interaction honeypots refers to technologies that emulates certain predesig-
nated services. They are passive (the honeypots are only listening) and allow only
limited interaction for attacker or malware as there is no real operating system
target that an attacker can operate on. This type of honeypot is evaluated as a
safer and easy way to gather information about the frequently occurred attacks and
their sources [35]. Likewise, it is relatively simple for an attacker to detect a low-
interaction honeypot because of its functional limitation.
• High-interaction honeypots are the ones that give attackers access to a real oper-
ating system and its applications. They are extremely complicated to build and
maintain. They are also at a very high level of risk. In returns, they can give a vast
amount of information about attackers and their attacks because they are more at-
tractive and they accept various types of attack. High-interaction honeypots have
been mainly used to capture and analyze autonomous propagating malware such
as worms, virus and botnets [19].
• Medium-interaction honeypots offer more interaction capabilities than low inter-
action honeypots but less functionalities than high-interaction honeypots. They are
still the emulators, they do not provide any real underlying operating system. As
a result, medium-interaction honeypots are safer than the high-interaction ones. In
these honeypots, the daemons are designed to mimic the functionality of some real
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applications when they interact with users. They give the attacker a better illusion
of a real system and get more possibility to interact. This type of honeypot has many
advantages, but developing such a system requires knowledge about the provided
protocols and services. The more services a honeypot provides, the more compli-
cated it is to deploy and maintain it.
The honeypots are popularly used in research and industries because of their many
advantages. They can be used to detect unauthorized activities such as scanning. They
can also be configured and deployed to capture the latest worm for analysis. The honey-
pots collect data that records only malicious activities. This is a data source of high value
because there is very little noise. These data can be used for analyzing attacks, profiling
attackers or training a smart security system.
2.1.2 Self-adaptive Honeypots
With the application of machine learning techniques, honeypots are becoming smarter.
Self-adaptive honeypots refer to the smart honeypots that can learn to make decision of
actions to be taken while interacting with attackers.
The first self-adaptive honeypot was introduced in 2011 by Wagener et. al. [37]. That
is a high-interaction honeypot which exposes a SSH service. The system leverages the
game-theoretic concepts and a variant of reinforcement learning method to learn to inter-
act with the hackers. It can decide to execute the received command or perform another
predefined action with a probability detected by reinforcement learning. The experimen-
tal results show that behavioral strategies are dependent on contextual parameters and
can serve as advanced building blocks for intelligent honeypots.
Inspired by the system of Wagener, some variants of the self-adaptive honeypot with
adaptations and improvements have been presented. Pauna et. al. [23] proposed a case-
adaptive honeypot, called CASSH, based on the existing medium-interaction honeypot
Kippo. The honeypot was designed using the Beliefs-Desires-Intentions agent model with
the learning capabilities of Case Base Reasoning technique, i.e. the actions are planned
using the accumulated experience learned from the similar tasks. In the next step, Pauna
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and Bica created a new changing behavior honeypot system called RASSH [20]. In this
system, the machine learning SARSA algorithm is used in the reinforcement learning
module to decide what action to be taken in responding to the attacker’s command. Ac-
cording to the authors, this system overlaps some of the disadvantages in the existing
systems. Recently, the same author proposed an improvement with the use of deep Q-
learning (DQN) algorithm to fully automate the decision process for a self-adaptive SSH
honeypot [22] and an IoT honeypot [21].
Besides the works of Pauna, in a study by Luo et. al. [15], an ”intelligent-interaction”
honeypot named IoTCandyJar was introduced for IoT devices. This system learns the
behaviours of IoT devices using a set of potential responses for the captured requests
collected from different public available IoT devices. To pass attacker’s checks, multiple
heuristics and reinforcement learning mechanism are applied to help the system learn
the best responses which has a high probability to be the one that the attackers wait for.
Their result shows that the honeypot is improved in term of session length and number
of captured attacks.
In another work, Dowling et. al. proposed another improvement of the self-adaptive
honeypot with a new state-action space formalism that aims at interact with the auto-
mated malware [6] [5].
In most self-adaptive honeypot systems, including the target system of this work, the
commands sent by attackers play an important role. They are the primary mean to de-
scribe the interaction situation, which influences directly the decision on which action to
take. Analyzing these commands and deriving useful information such as their risk level
can then be helpful to improve the performance and the effectiveness of those systems,
especially the SSH honeypots. In Sec. 2.3, some studies on the analysis of user commands
in SSH compromises will be discussed.
2.2 Risk Level Definition
According to the EBIOS Risk Manager method guide [9], the term “risk” and “risk level”
are defined as follows:
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• Risk: Possibility of a feared event occurring and that its effects affect the missions of
the studied object.
• Risk Level: Measurement of the extent of the risk, expressed by combining the sever-
ity and the likelihood.
The term “feared event” which is used in the definition of risk is also defined in the
EBIOS guide:
• A feared event is associated with a business asset and harms a security need or
criterion of the business asset (examples: unavailability of a service, illegitimate
modification of a high temperature threshold of an industrial process, disclosure of
classified data, modification of a database). The feared events to be exploited are
those of the strategic scenarios and relate to the impact of an attack on a business
asset. Each feared event is assessed according to the level of severity of the conse-
quences, using metrics.
Let identify the feared event in our context. This work concentrates on evaluating the
risk level of the Linux commands sent from an attacker to a honeypot after he successfully
logged in to the system with a SSH username and password. Then the feared event is
the action “send a command to the system” of the attacker. At the moment when the
system evaluates the command, it’s obvious that the command was sent successfully (so
that the honeypot received and will process it). Then, the possibility of the feared event
occurring is 1. By consequence, the estimation of the risk level of a command becomes
the evaluation of its severity.
It is not easy to estimate the risk level of each Linux command. Firstly, this task re-
quires expert knowledge and experience to correctly evaluate how a command can make
change to a system. Secondly, the severity of executing a command depends heavily on
the state of its environment. For example, someone types a command rm to delete a file in
the system. In the terminal (or the bash history), only the command name and file name
present. But the result of the action depends on many environmental factors. Does the
files exist in the current directory? Does the current user have the write permission on it?
If the file doesn’t exist or the user doesn’t have the write permission, then the command
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“rm” doesn’t have any impact on the system. By contrast, that command can make a
catastrophe if the target file is important.
In this work, the environmental factors are not yet taken into account (but the com-
mand parameters are still considered). We consider only the impact that a command can
cause to the system when all necessary conditions are satisfied for it to be successfully
executed. With this assumption, the command “rm” is always dangerous because an
attacker can always delete any file that he wants.
2.3 Related works on the analysis of SSH compromises
Since their appearance, the honeypots have been providing a high quality source of ma-
licious data for analysis. Various works have been published, revealing the attacking
patterns and the behaviour of the attackers.
Despite many researches on attack data, few works exploit the sequences of com-
mands sent from the attackers. In [27], Ramsbrock et. al. presented a method to profile
the behaviour of the attackers by exploiting the snapshots of Linux commands captured
from their high-interaction honeypots. The authors identified seven groups of commands
representing the typical actions that an attacker can take: check software configuration,
install a program, download a file, run a rogue program, change password, check hard-
ware configuration and change the system configuration. The attacker profile is then
represented in form of a state machine where the actions are represented by the states
and their orders are represented by the transitions.
In [7], Dumont et. al. leverages the malicious Linux commands recorded from their
SSH honeypots to learn a system that can detect the malicious remote Shell sessions. The
collected honeypot session logs are used together with the content of the .bash history
files crawled from github.com to form a data set for training and testing purpose. The n-
grams are then extracted from the sequences of 1-4 consecutive commands and used as
features to train a k-nearest-neighbors classifier. Even if the proposed pipeline is quite
simple, the experimental results are impressive: the classifier reaches a true positive rate
of 99.4% and a true negative rate of 99.7% with sequences of four shell commands.
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The solution proposed by Dumont et. al. [7] is for detecting the malicious SSH ses-
sions. In the problem of classifying commands by level of risk, this model can be useful
when the number of risk levels is reduced to 2, i.e a command could be evaluated to be
one of the two case: safe (benign) or risky (malicious). The approach of Dumont is then
re-implemented as a part of the proposed solution and plays the role of a baseline model.
Next, this baseline will progressively be improved by introducing different representa-
tion models for text data. Later, an original solution to the full problem of classifying
the commands by multiple risk levels will be proposed without requiring hand-labeled
data. The method reasoning and the implementation are presented in the chapter 3, 4 and
5 of the thesis.
Summary Chapter Background and related works
In this chapter, the definitions of honeypot and self-adaptive honeypot are pre-
sented.
The honeypots can be classified by their level of interaction, there are 3 categories:
low-interaction honeypot, high-interaction honeypot and medium interaction hon-
eypot.
The definitions of the terms risk and risk level are also presented. The risk level of
a command sent to the honeypot is its degree of severity.
The estimation of the risk level of a command is complicated because of the under-
lying environment state. In this work, we consider only the impact that a command
can cause to the system when all necessary conditions are satisfied for it to be suc-
cessfully executed.
This chapter also summaries some existing works related to the analysis of user
commands. Some of them give us inspiration to elaborate the solution that will be




This chapter presents our proposed solution for the problem of classifying the commands
in SSH session by multiple risk levels. We consider two cases in this thesis. In the simple
case where there are only two risk levels: normal (level 0) and risky (level 1), our problem
is a binary classification problem. By discriminating these two class, we indeed solve the
problem of detection of malicious commands. In the general case, we need to classify
a command by different risk levels, that is a multi-class classification problem. Another
approach to this problem is to use the syntax analyzer to analyze the Linux command. A
traditional rule-based method can then be used to filter the processed commands through
a set of specific rules. The disadvantage of this approach will be discussed in Chap. 5
when we have multiple risk levels to estimate for each command. The biggest advantages
of Machine Learning approach is that (i) we do not have to maintain a complicated set of
rules (ii) we can define clearly the performance metrics to evaluate the models, (iii) we
can generalize (make prediction) with unseen data.
Our work focuses on building a complete workflow to accomplish the tasks defined
above. Applying the machine learning methods for classification is only on step in the
whole workflow. The other important parts are: data collection, data labeling, data clean-
ing and pre-processing, data transformation, evaluating of the predictive model and in-
terpreting the results. The complete workflows for the two cases are presented in details
in Sec. 3.1 and Sec. 3.2. The most important parts of our work are in (i) the representation
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learning for the text data and (ii) the procedure of automatically building the Label Model
for labeling the dataset.
3.1 Workflow for the Detection of Malicious Commands
We first consider the problem of classifying the commands by risk levels in a special
case where there are only two levels: normal (benign, label 0) and risky (malicious, la-
bel 1). It now becomes a binary classification problem of identifying if a command is
risky/malicious (class positive) or normal/benign (class negative). It can also be consid-
ered as a problem of detecting the malicious commands. 1 The proposed workflow for
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[0.12, 0.56, ...., 0.33] 0
[0.24, 0.67, ...., 0.09] 0
... ...
[0.01, 0.08, ...., 0.12] 1
[0.76, 0.81, ...., 0.04] 1





Figure 3.1: Workflow of binary classification problem for detecting malicious commands.
The most important part is how to transform the text data into numerical data (vector) to
use in the Machine Learning algorithms.
This workflow is inspired by the work of Dumont et. al [7]. In brief, we first need to
collect example commands for both classes, then transform the text commands into the
numerical vectors. Different representation models to transform the text commands are
reviewed including the traditional Bag-of-Word model [11], the TF-IDF model [12] and
1The name negative, positive class come from the analogy in medical testing. If a patient is infected
by a disease, we say the patient is positive to the disease X. In the binary classification, the positive class is
assigned label 1 and the negative class is assigned level 0 (or -1, but in our work, we use label 0, that can be
interpreted as zero risk level, i.e. no risk.
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the modern Doc2Vec model [13]. These models are explained in great details in Chap. 4.
Combining these representation models with different classification models gives us dif-
ferent pipelines for the malicious commands detection task. These pipelines are evaluated
with the guideline presented in Sec. 3.3.
3.2 Workflow for the Classification of Commands by Mul-
tiple Risk Levels
The proposed workflow for the problem of classification of commands by multiple risk
levels is illustrated in Fig. 3.2.
In this problem, we will work uniquely on the commands captured on the two honey-
pots deployed by Mr. Touch in his doctoral project. The classification task is a supervised
learning problem, so the labeled data are required for training and testing purpose. In
our case, the labeled data (the risk level associated with each command) are not yet avail-
able. In order to build the dataset for a supervised learning model, we first need to label
the data, i.e assign the risk level to each command in the dataset. Hand-labeling a large
amount of text commands is a time-consuming task that requires the expert knowledge.
We propose to use the Labeling Model [28], a novel approach to build the data program-
matically and automatically with weak supervision.
As illustrated in Fig. 3.2, in the Data Collection phase, we firstly do the exploratory data
analysis (by using an unsupervised machine learning method such as topic modeling) to
gain some insights about the dataset. We also benefit from some prior knowledge about
the Linux commands (of an expert or of the Linux users) to describe the rules of how to
estimate - no need to very accurate - the risk level of a particular command. We then write
an ensemble of labeling functions (in Python) to encode these knowledge and heuristics
and construct a Labeling Model. The result model will automatically assign the label for
each unlabeled command in the dataset.
In the next phase, the text data are transformed into vector of features. This phase
follows the similar workflow as in the binary classification problem. The result training
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vectors will then be fit to a multi-class classification model. Since the labeling functions are
flexible and very easy to maintain, based on the performance of the classification, we can
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Figure 3.2: Workflow of multi-class classification problem for classifying the commands
by risk levels. The most important part is the procedure to estimate risk level for the
unlabeled commands using the novel Labeling Model.
3.3 Evaluation of Classification Models
Typically in a classification problem, the performance of a classifier can be measured by
the accuracy metric. The accuracy is calculated in function of the number of data points in
the test set that are correctly classified. This is the standard metric for any kind of classifi-
cation model. However, for the binary classification model for sensitive applications such
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as fraud transaction detection, cancer diagnosis or our malicious command detection, we
need another metric. Let think of the following examples: a fraud transaction is predicted
as legit and is processed, a cancer patient is diagnosed as just having a benign tumor and
goes home without any special treatment, and a dangerous malicious command is classi-
fied as normal and allowed to be executed in the real system. These are some examples of
bad prediction in the binary classification problem, where the positive value (fraud, can-
cer, malicious) are predicted as negative (legit, benign, normal). In these cases, this kind
of inaccurate prediction can cause harmful consequences. As the accuracy of a machine
learning model never reaches 100%, for the sensitive applications, another metric called
confusion matrix is useful to estimate the inaccurate prediction part in more detail.
Table 3.3 explains the content of a confusion matrix. The definition and representation
of confusion matrix are sometimes confused, particularly for the binary classification.
Here we use the notation in the Machine Learning textbook of Murphy [18].
Predicted Label
Negative (0) Positive (1)
True 
Label
Negative (0) True Negative False Positive
Positive (1) False Negative True Positive
Figure 3.3: Definition of confusion matrix for the classification problem.
The following metrics are reported in the confusion matrix:
• True Negative: Real negative is predicted as negative.
• True Positive: Real positive is predicted as positive.
• False Positive: Real negative is predicted as positive.
• False Negative: Real positive is predicted as negative.
The True Negative and True Positive reflect the accuracy of the prediction and are expected
to be high. The False Positive error is also called false alarm error and often less critical than
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the False Negative error in our specific problem. It should note that, the criterion of these
metrics depends on the problem. Let us consider another problem of spam detection. The
spam emails are labeled positive (class 1) and the non-spam emails are labeled negative
(class 0). The goal of a spam detector is to prevent the spam emails from appearing in the
primary mail box, instead put them in the spam folder. In practice, if some spam emails
are classified as normal (False Negative error), we will be a little annoyed seeing the spam
emails in the mail box, but that is not a big problem. On the contrary, if an important
working emails is classified as spam (False Positive error), we can not see them in the mail
box and we may miss some important information. In this case, the False Positive is more
critical than the False Negative and should be reduced as much as possible.
Back to our binary classification model, the target is to increase the accuracy while
maintaining a low False Negative error. There are also some other suggested targets for
the binary classification such as increasing the recall of the positive class and increasing
the precision of the negative class. However these targets are not clear and do not show the
natural of the problem. Choosing the appropriate metrics for the problem is an important
step, and defining the evaluation metrics beforehand helps us focus on the target. 2 (See
more details in Chap. 4)
The confusion matrix and the accuracy metric are also used for the problem of classi-
fication by multiple risk levels. In this task, the labeled data are not available. We thus
construct a Labeling Model to automatically assign the labels for our dataset. The target
in this task is to increase the accuracy and reduce both False Negative and False Positive
errors. (See more details in Chap. 5).
2We do not simply apply the machine learning model on the available data and report the results. In-
stead, we define the target for our system first, and then collect data, train the model towards this target.
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Summary Chapter Solution Elaboration
We are constructing a workflows for a system, that can (i) automatically detect if
an input command is benign/normal or malicious and (ii) tell how risky an input
command is. We propose to formulate these tasks as classification problems:
• A Binary Classification problem to classify an input command as normal (class
0) or malicious (class 1).
• A Multi-class Classification problem to assign a particular risk level for each
input command.
We build different Machine Learning pipelines to solve these two problems. In
order to make a Machine Learning solution work, we need labeled data, we need
to train a model to learn from data so we can output prediction on the unseen data.
• We first collect the data, label them, pre-process and transform them into nu-
merical vectors.
• We train different classification models, explain how to evaluate these model
and draw attention to the importance of reducing the False Negative error.
Our contribution in this work is 3-fold:
• We construct a complete machine learning workflow to solve the problem of
classifying the commands by multiple risk levels, which is the objective of this
work.
• We evaluate different ways to represent the input text commands and find
that the Doc2Vec model works best. We achieve around 97% accuracy for the
binary classification.
• We propose to use Labeling Model, an automatic and programmatic way to
label a large dataset that provide reliable labels. That help us achieve around
99% accuracy for the multi-class classification with five defined risk levels.
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Chapter 4
Detection of Malicious Commands in
SSH Session
The first problem we are dealing with is to detect the malicious commands. Indeed, this
is the simple case in our main problem of classifying the commands by risk level where
there are only two risk levels: 0 (normal, benign) and 1 (risky, malicious). With this for-
mulation, we make an assumption saying that, the commands in the working sessions of
normal users are considered benign and the commands in the SSH sessions of the attack-
ers captured on the honeypots is considered malicious.
If we have enough good examples for the benign and the malicious commands, we
can train a binary classification model to discriminate these two classes. As discussed in
Sec. 2.3, the work of Dumont et. al. [7] fits quite well with this problem. We therefore re-
implement the model of Dumont as part of our solution and use it as our baseline model.
First, the commands from different sources are collected to form the dataset (Sec. 4.1).
Second, the representation models are built to transform the text data into feature vectors.
In Sec. 4.2 we review the simple Bag-of-Word model followed by some more robust and
widely used models (N -command, TF-IDF and Doc2Vec). These representation models
are experimented with different classification models in Sec. 4.3. We analyze in depth
the performance of the proposed workflow based on the accuracy and the False Negative
error.
20
4.1 Data Collection and Pre-processing
Since the classification models require labeled data, we have to collect sufficient example
for both classes benign and malicious. In our experiments, two sources of data are used.
• Benign example commands are collected from public bash log files in Github. They
are the history of input commands of normal users in their working sessions. We
crawl 660 long .bash_history files containing 210, 402 commands. The label 0
(negative class) are assigned to these commands to indicate that they are benign
(coming from normal users).
• Malicious example commands are collected from the two honeypots by Mr. Touch .
These data include 694, 643 commands of 76, 778 short sessions. All these commands
are assigned the label 1 (positive class indicating malicious/risky commands).
There are 905, 045 commands in total, 70% of them is used to train the classification
and the remaining 30% (271, 514 commands) is reserved for the test set. Following the
workflow proposed in Fig. 3.1, we focus on building representation models to transform
the text commands into vectors and building classification models for detecting malicious
commands. The representation model and classification model are trained and tuned on
the training set. In the prediction step, the test data is first passed through the represen-
tation model to obtain the feature vectors. These vectors are then fed to the classification
model to get the final prediction result. 1
The data representation models presented in this chapter are also used in the work-
flow of the classification of the commands by multiple risk-levels (Chap. 5). Before build-
ing the representation models, a simple pre-processing step is applied to the input text
commands in order to remove the unique strings like random generated file names, long
file paths, email addresses, IP addresses and URLs.
1We do not use a separate validation set since training a complex model like Doc2Vec takes time. We
tune the hyper-parameters of the models mostly by grid search with several common values. We simply
compare the accuracy on the training and on the test set to avoid overfitting.
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4.2 Representation Learning for text data
The text command is comprehensive to human, however, in order to analyze them using
Statistical Machine Learning techniques, we have to perform mathematical operations on
them. Thus the text data must be transformed into numerical vectors (which is called
the feature vectors). Several basic techniques in Natural Language Processing (NLP) are
applied to process the textual commands.
4.2.1 Basic Concepts
Our dataset is a collection of Linux commands. Each command is called a document. A
document is in fact a sequence of text, it can be as long as a book/an article or as short as
a message/a tweet. In our context, basically, we treat each command as a document. We
can also treat one command and several previous commands as a document. A document
can be tagged, that means it can be accompanied by a list of tags to indicate different
labels/properties assigned to it. For the problem of classification the command by risk
level, each command is tagged by it corresponding estimated risk level.
When processing a document, it can be tokenized, i.e., separated into tokens by some
rules (such as breaking at the end of each sentence or breaking by the white space). In
our application, a document is one or several commands glued together, the tokenizer
simply breaks a document into words or terms. For example, tokenzing the command
pip install --upgrade gensim gives a list of tokens (or unigram)
[’pip’, ’install’, ’--upgrade’, ’gensim’].
It can be useful if we care about not only individual word but also a group of consecutive
words. For example, for the command given above, if we would like to extract all pairs
of two consecutive words (called bigram or 2-gram), we have
[’pip_install’, ’install_--upgrade’, ’--upgrade_gensim’].
Similarly, if we extract a tuple of three words (called trigram or 3-gram), we have
[’pip_install_--upgrade’, ’install_--upgrade_gensim’].
The whole dataset is called the corpus. The corpus can be understand as a standard
way to organize the data, which is used by the model such as a topic model (which looks
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for the hidden topics/themes in the corpus). In general, the most common task in NLP is
to infer the latent (hidden) structures in the corpus. These structures can be the groups of
documents with close semantic meaning or the classes of documents with the same tag.
In order to do that, the corpus must be manipulated mathematically and numerically. By
characterizing a document, we can represent each document as a vector of its features.
Different ways to characterize the document give us different representation models.
4.2.2 Document Representation Model
The most fundamental and most important document representation model is the Bag-of-
Words (BoW) model. In the early 50s, Zellig Harris, an influence linguist found that, “each
language can be described in terms of a distributional structure, i.e. in terms of the occurrence
of parts relative to other parts” [11]. The BoW model represents each document by the
occurrence (frequency) of each word.2 First, a dictionary of vocabulary is constructed
from all the words in the corpus. The dictionary contains all the unique tokens with their
frequency in the corpus. The dictionary can be made richer by using n-gram (normally 2-
gram or 3-gram) tokens. (In that way, we can have a dictionary that contains at the same
time unigram, 2-gram and/or 3-gram and so on). As the dictionary can be very large,
we should consider to limit its size D, set several rules to ignore the stop words, to filter
out the strange words that appears very few times, etc. The BoW model is exactly this
dictionary (of size D) with the optimal data structure to store and retrieve data efficiently.
A document is encoded by a vector of size D (called a count-vector). The indices of
element in the vector correspond to the words stored in the dictionary (that depends on
the data structure), and the values are the number of occurrence of the corresponding
word.
Despite its simplicity, the BoW model is still useful in many situations, particularly
in our application, due to two reasons. First, the Linux commands (a document in BoW
model) are often non-ambiguous. A command has an unique name and does specific,
2It should clearly note that, the occurrence is the count of how many times a word appears in the doc-
uments, it is an integer number. The frequency is the count normalized, and is float number. But in a
general BoW model, we can use two terms interchangeably. We will specify the usage of frequency in other
(TF-IDF) model.
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deterministic task(s). It is distinguishable by its name (and/or some specific parameters).
That makes a document in a BoW model distinguishable by specific word(s) in the dic-
tionary. Second, the set of Linux commands is limited and very small in comparison to
the set of vocabulary in human language, thus it makes the construction of BoW very fast
and efficient. However, the largest disadvantage of BoW model is that the order of the
words in a document is completely ignored. We can overcome this shortcoming by using
n-gram tokens (n > 1) to specify the order of words (which is usually called the spatial
information).
This idea is also applied in computer vision and usually called Bag of Visual Fea-
tures [38] model. This approach bases on hand-crafted visual features like Scale Invariant
Feature Transform (SIFT) [14] feature, which is the vector of mathematical descriptions of
local keypoints in an image. Instead of representing the image by a matrix of pixels, it can
be represented by a histogram of visual features, which brings more semantic meaning
for the vision tasks.
4.2.3 More Robust Representation Models
The basic BoW model represents the document by count-vector. The first improvement
discussed above is to use n-gram to specify the order of the words. For example, we can
create a BoW model with all unigram, bigram and trigram for each document (denoted
as {1, 2, 3}-gram). The second improvement is to represent the command in its context.
We use the notation 1-command to denote that only one current command is processed
at a time. N -command notation denotes that the current command and N − 1 previous
commands are merged together to create a new bigger command that hold the historical
context [7]. The third improvement is to use more robust representation models like TF-
IDF or Doc2Vec model. These proposed representation models will be detailed in this
section.3
3In this chapter, we should distinguish two notations: n-gram is a combination of n consecu-
tive/adjacency tokens and N -command is a combination of a command and its N −1 previous commands.
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N -command
In the BoW model, one command in the dataset is considered as a document. However
it can be more useful when we consider a command in its surrounding context. The
context around a command is limited to the N − 1 previous commands since in the real
situation, we can only access the historical input commands. In each SSH session, an
N -command can be created by taking the current command and applying a sliding win-
dow of size N to its previous commands. 1-command means that only one command
is considered at a time. More specifically, the N -command representation for the com-
mand cmd(t) is defined as a list of the command itself and its previous N − 1 commands
cmd(t−1), . . . , cmd(t−N−1). An example for the construction of 3-command is illustrated in
Fig. 4.1. With this approach, a command (a document) cmd(t) is now represented by a new
document [cmd(t−N−1), . . . , cmd(t−1), cmd(t)]. In the new document, the input order of the
commands is preserved. The new document can be now fed directly to the BoW model
or other representation models.
Figure 4.1: Example of N -command representation. From a list of input commands, we
group the current command with its two previous commands in their order to create a
new set of 3-command documents. In this example, the resource url in the wget command
is replaced by URL , the file path used in chmod and bash commands are replaced by
PATH for readability.
N -command representation can be more robust than 1-command for malicious com-
mand detection (as explained in our experiment in the next section), but is it always suit-
able for different problems? In the binary classification problem, all the commands in
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every SSH session are assigned the same label. Taking N commands in the same session
together to create a new document is logical and reasonable since this does not change the
label of the new document. However, in the multi-class classification problem (where the
commands are classified by different risk levels - Chap. 5), the commands in the same ses-
sion have different labels. Combining a command with its historical commands makes
a confused set of labels and it does not help the classification task. For that reason, in
our experiments, both 1-command and N -command is used and compared for the binary
classification task (Sec. 4.3), and only 1-command is used for multi-class classification task
(Sec. 5.4).
TF-IDF Model
In the original BoW model, the input document is represented by a count-vector, in which
each element count(t, d) is the raw count of the number of times the word (term) t ap-
pears in the given document d. We can see that, even when the stop words and the very
common words are removed, there are still several terms that occur much more often
than other terms, for example, the keywords or the specific (technical) terms in an article.
Moreover, if the document d is long, the term t can have more chances to appear in d. For
another document d′ having similar content as d but is shorter, the same term t has less
chances to appear in d′ than in d. This weakness of the count-vector in BoW model comes
from the fact that the raw count is not normalized. A simple way to normalize this raw
count is to divide it by the count of all other term t′ in the document t. The term frequency
(TF) of a term t for the given document d is defined as





With the normalization defined above, we can only avoid the dominant of the very
frequent terms. In one hand, the term frequency of all the term in a document must
sum to one. That means if there are many common terms in the document, the values
of f(t, d) for the other terms will be low. It is necessary to re-weight TF (t, d). The first
weighting function proposed by Karen S. Jones [12] was originally called term specificity
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and later became the famous inverse document frequency (IDF) function. The intuition is
that “term which occurs in many documents is not a good discriminator, and should be
given less weight than one which occurs in few documents” [12].
The idea of the IDF function is derived from Information Theory [33]. The high prob-
ability events (the event that occurs very often) have low information. For example, the
weather has been hot for two weeks in Namur, it is not surprise when we see the weather
forecast say it will be 33◦C tomorrow. Inversely, the low probability events (the event oc-
curs very rarely) have high information. With the same example, if it is said that there will
be a thunderstorm and heavy rain tomorrow morning, it will be more surprise. Back to
our model, if the terms which appear across many documents in the corpus C will bring
less information since they can not be used to distinguish the different documents. The
less-common terms that appear in few documents in the corpus are more informative and
can be used to distinguish these documents.
For a discrete event x which has a probability of occurrence p(x), the Shannon informa-
tion of this event is quantified by
information(x) = − log(p(x)) = log 1
p(x)
.
The term t plays the role of the event x. The probability p(x) can be interpreted as the
probability that the term t appears in any document in the corpus C. And thus the inverse
document frequency of the term t in the corpus C is defined as
IDF (t, C) = log |C|
1 + |d ∈ C : t ∈ d|
, (4.2)
where |C| is the number of documents in the corpus, |d ∈ C : t ∈ d| is the number of docu-
ments in which the term t appears.4 Finally, the TF-IDF of a term t for a given document
d in the corpus C is defined as
TF-IDF(t, d, C) = TF (t, d) · IDF (t, C). (4.3)
4The denominator is adjusted by adding a constant (1) to avoid the divide-by-zero error when the term
t is not indexed in the corpus (and thus it does not appear in any document).
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The TF-IDF model represents each document d by a vector of TF-IDF values for every
term t in the corpus C. TF-IDF model produces useful representation of documents in
such a way that similar documents have similar vector representations (which is often
measured by the cosine distance). Thanks to this characteristic, this model is widely used
in Information Retrieval [26]. In our experiments, the pipelines using the representation
of TF-IDF model give the best accuracy (See more details the next session).
Modern Word2Vec and Doc2Vec Models
With the goal of representing a document by a vector, one naive approach is to represent
every word in the document by a vector of same length (e.g., using Word2Vec model [16])
then average these vectors. However, this method does not preserve the order of the
words. An other powerful solution is the Paragraph Vector model [13], which is known
as Doc2Vec or Sentence2Vec model. It is an unsupervised representation learning method
used to transform a text with variate length (a document, a paragraph or a sentence) to a
fixed-length feature vector. This model bases on the Word2Vec model, which is presented
briefly as follows.
One of the most useful techniques in computational linguistic is to learn a distributed
representation of word in a vector space, i.e. to represent each word by a vector [1]. “Ditributed”
here means that, the word is not processed alone but is considered in the surrounding con-
text. For example, the word “foot” in the context of the sentence “Neil Armstrong is ready to
plant the first human foot on another world” 5 means a part of human body. In another context
like in the sentence “Each chair is arranged one foot apart.”, “foot” is a unit of measure. Since
the context of a word is important, a word should be represented in a distributed manner.
Fig. 4.2 illustrates how to represent a word in a distributed manner. To understand this
schema, we can think as follows. On one hand, the information of a word w(t) (like its
meaning) can be determined by its surrounding words [w(t−2), w(t−1), w(t+1), w(t+2)]. This
is called Word2Vec Continuous Bag-of-Word model in Fig. 4.2a. On the other hand, the
information of a word w(t) (like the emotions it brings) can also be distributed (shared)
5https://www.nasa.gov/mission pages/apollo/apollo11.html
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to its surrounding words [w(t−2), w(t−1), w(t+1), w(t+2)]. This is called Word2Vec Skip-gram
model in Fig. 4.2b.
(a) Word2Vec Continuous Bag-of-Word model. (b) Word2Vec Skip-gram model.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of Word2Vec Model.6
The Doc2Vec model is exactly the Word2Vec model with an additional document en-
coding information. In that way, a word will be predicted from not only its surround-
ing words but also the document containing that word. In our experiment, we use the
Doc2Vec implementation in gensim [32]7.
4.3 Binary Classification Models
Several reviewed representation models for text are applied to our problem of detection
of malicious commands. This section discusses briefly the used classification methods,
6The figures are taken from the the blog post of Sebastian Ruder [34] (URL: https://ruder.io/word-
embeddings-1)
7Gensim Doc2Vec URL: https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/models/doc2vec.html
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how to use the feature vector representation of Linux commands with these classification
models and how to evaluate the prediction results.
The experiments are performed with two classification methods. The first one is the K-
Nearest Neighbor (KNN) model (with K=5). This model is simple, very fast to train since
it simply remembers the whole training set, but the prediction time is very slow. The
second one is the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [4] model, which is robust and more
memory efficient than KNN. SVM model works well with high dimensional data. It will
find a hyper-plane to linearly separate the training data. However, the hyper-parameters
of this model is more difficult to tune. We use the LinearSVC implementation in scikit-
learn [24] and find these best hyper-parameters for our dataset: {C = 0.1, tol = 1.5e−3}8.
By combining different representations with different classification models, we do the
experiments with four different pipelines, which are summarised in Table 4.1.
Context Feature Representation Classification Accuracy False Negative





{1, 2, 3}-gram + TF-IDF 98.27% 2,066
{1, 2, 3}-gram + Doc2Vec 96.71% 1,449
Table 4.1: Summary of the experimental results for binary classification problem.
The baseline model (using simple count-vector representation of 1-command BoW
model and KNN, similar to one of the models proposed by Dumont et al. [7]) has a low
accuracy of 89% on the test set of our own data. It also has a serious problem, that is the
False Negative error is too high. That means, for this model, there are many (around 28K)
malicious commands classified as benign. The detailed classification report can be found
in Table 4.2.
8C, one of the most important hyper-parmeters of a linear SVM model, is the coefficient of the regular-
ization (‘l2-regularization’ is used in our experiment). tol is the tolerance for stopping criteria.
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The LinearSVC model is more difficult to train (that requires tuning several hyper-
parameters), but the accuracy on the test set is good enough and the prediction is very
quick. The quick prediction is helpful when we want to deploy the classification model
on real system as we have to make decision in real-time to respond to the input command
of the attacker. The three other pipelines in Table 4.1 are trained using LinearSVC with
the same hyper-parameters to facilitate the comparison.
As explained in Sec. 3.3, the False Negative metric is important for our binary classifi-
cation problem. This metric measures how many malicious commands are predicted as
benign. In real system, if the malicious commands are passed through and executed, they
can make harmful impact to the system. We make efforts to reduce this False Negative
error without reducing the accuracy.
All three proposed pipelines give better results than the baseline model. The first
pipeline using 3-command 1-gram with TF-IDF features achieves a good accuracy on the
test set (Table 4.3). The False Negative is enormously reduced from more than 28K cases
to 2, 292 cases. The second pipeline uses {1, 2, 3}-gram, slightly reduces the False Negative
to 2, 026 cases (Table 4.4). Finally, the last pipeline uses Doc2Vec embedding, reduces the
False Negative to 1, 449 cases (Table 4.5) with a small decrease of performance. In conclu-
sion, the last model is considered as the best one since it achieves a good accuracy while
maintaining a very low False Negative error.
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Baseline model with count-vector
Precision Recall F1-score Support
Class 0 0.68 0.99 0.81 63010
Class 1 1.0 0.86 0.92 208504
Accuracy 0.89 271514
Highlights
• The model is fast to train
but very low in prediction
(the disadvantage of KNN
model)
• Low accuracy.
• Very high False Negative,
that is unacceptable in our
system.
Table 4.2: Binary classification results with baseline model.
3-command 1-gram, TF-IDF features
Precision Recall F1-score Support
Class 0 0.96 0.96 0.96 63010
Class 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 208504
Accuracy 0.98 271514
Highlights
• The accuracy is largely im-
proved in comparison to
the baseline model.
• The False Negative is also
enormously reduced from
more than 28K cases to
2, 292 cases.
• The good performance is
obtained thanks to the
better representation (us-
ing 3-command) and the
better classification (Lin-
earSVM).
Table 4.3: Binary classification results with 3-command 1-gram and TF-IDF features.
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3-command {1,2,3}-gram, TF-IDF features
Precision Recall F1-score Support
Class 0 0.97 0.96 0.96 63010
Class 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 208504
Accuracy 0.98 271514
Highlights
• Using {1, 2, 3}-gram (a
tuple of 3 consecutive
tokens) improves slightly
the performance.
• The False Negative is re-
duced a little (from 2, 292
to 2, 066 cases).
Table 4.4: Binary classification results with 3-command {1, 2, 3}-gram and TF-IDF fea-
tures.
3-command {1,2,3}-gram, Doc2Vec
Precision Recall F1-score Support
Class 0 0.97 0.88 0.93 63010
Class 1 0.97 0.99 0.98 208504
Accuracy 0.97 271514
Highlights
• The accuracy is slightly
lower than the models us-
ing TF-IDF features.
• We achieve a lowest False
Negative of 1, 449 cases
among the 4 experimented
pipelines.
Table 4.5: Binary classification results with the output of Doc2Vec model.
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Summary Chapter Detection of Malicious Commands in SSH Session
In this chapter, we formulate the problem as a binary classification problem: iden-
tify that a command is benign (class 0 - class negative) or malicious (class 1 - class
positive). The bash logs from Github (containing histories of normal users’ input
commands in their working sessions) are used as examples for the negative class.
The commands captured in the Cowrie logs from two honeypots (setup in our
project) are used as examples for the positive class. These three important points
are discussed:
1. Construction of a robust representation model for text command that trans-
form text into vector of features.
2. Comparison of different pipeline for the binary classification task.
3. Evaluation of the accuracy of the predictive model with a focus on the False
Negative, an important metric in our malicious command detection problem.
In order to obtain an useful representation of a command, we can consider the con-
text around it. For example, for a current input command cmd(t), we take two pre-
vious commands to create a 3-command representation: [cmd(t−2), cmd(t−1), cmd(t)].
Each 3-command is considered as a document and we use Doc2Vec model to trans-
form this document into a vector.
There are many binary classification model. The simplest one, a K-Nearest Neigh-
bors model can be trained very quickly but the prediction is very slow. Inversely,
the more complicated but powerful model like the linear SVM model is more
difficult to train but the prediction is very accurate and efficient.
Our proposed pipeline:
{bash logs + honeypots logs} −→ Doc2Vec model −→ Linear SVM classification
gives 97% accuracy and low False Negative on the test set.
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Chapter 5
Classification of the Commands in SSH
Session by Risk Levels
Going beyond the detection of malicious commands, we now tackle a more difficult prob-
lem: classifying input commands by risk levels. Simply speaking, we need to estimate
how is risky a command to our system in order to help a smart honeypot make decision.
For example, if the command has a low risk level, the honeypot can let it pass through
and can let it be executed. On the contrary, if the command has a high risk level, the
honeypot can block it in order to prevent it from being executed in the real system.
The classification model requires labelled data, which are the pairs of a command and
its assigned risk level. In our case, we lack the correct risk level associated with each com-
mand, that make the automatic classification task impossible. We have discussed what is
the risk level of a command and how to estimate in Sec. 2.2. We present several useful
observations in our proper data (in Sec. 5.1) that can help us to find the heuristics to es-
timate the risk level (in Sec. 5.2). From these heuristic, we can programmatically build the
training data by constructing the labeling functions (details in Sec. 5.3). With the new esti-
mated labels, we build a multi-class classification model and demonstrate its predictions
on the real input commands (Sec.5.4). In the following sections, we will assign to each
command a level of risk in range from R0 to R4. R0 is the lowest risk level, indicating
that a command is not risky. R4 is the highest risk level, indicating that a command is
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very dangerous. A solution to automatically label the risk level to the dataset (using a
novel approach called Labeling Model) will also be presented.
5.1 Exploratory data analysis
We have now an unlabelled dataset containing 694, 643 commands captured in the Cowrie
logs by two honeypots. We found that there are not much human manual attacks on these
honeypots, and the content of the SSH sessions are quite similar.1 Most of commands are
probably sent from automatic programs which scan for the exposed IP address and try to
exploit the resource on these machines. Before building a classification model, we must
do several Exploratory Data Analysis tasks in order to understand our data.
5.1.1 Observation 1: Word Cloud
Figure 5.1: Word-cloud of the top 100 frequent tokens parsed from the commands in our
dataset. Only the valid tokens starting with alphabetic letter are considered.
First of all, from the corpus of input commands captured in the honeypots, we take
the top 100 most frequent tokens and visualize them in form of the word-cloud as shown in
Fig. 5.1. In fact we extract the alphabetic tokens from the text commands, remove the low
1Thanks to Mr. Touch for the preliminary analysis and the discussion.
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frequent (uncommon) tokens and use the size of the text to present the relative frequency
of each token. This word-cloud helps us to see the common commands (or tokens) used in
the attack sessions. It is clear that the frequency of the commands does not tell anything
about the their risk level. However it gives us the first intuition about what happened
in a remote session: maybe some scripts was downloaded with curl and executed by
bash/sh, and all the traces were deleted by touching the history with histfilesize.
This helps us to draw our attention to the most used commands, without worry about all
the available commands in the system. 2 We can therefore invite the experts in Security
domain to estimate the risk level only for an important subset of Linux commands for our
system.
5.1.2 Observation 2: Topic Modeling
In addition, it can be helpful if we can see different group of input commands in our
system. This type of analysis is unsupervised since we can simply regroup the commands
by their similarities. For the text data, we apply a topic modeling method to find the hid-
den topics (semantic clusters) in the data. Latent dirichlet allocation (LDA) model [2] is
widely used since it does not only reveal the hidden topics but also provides the most
representative words in each topic. The result of LDA model for our data with eight top-
ics is shown in Table 5.1. We can change the number of topics to see different patterns.
Technically, the found topics are not good enough to represent all the input commands in
our dataset because of two reasons: (i) the command (which is considered as a document)
is short w.r.t. the usual literature document, and (ii) it is often very hard to see the seman-
tic relationship between the tokens (called words in LDA) in a command. However, we
can find that the obtained groups are coherent enough. For instance, Topic 1 talks about
the commands for downloading like wget or curl and the relevant pattern related to
internet resource like http:_PATH_ or _IP_. Topic 6 talks about the chmod command
2In the sunrise.info.fundp.ac.be server of UNamur, we found 3309 available commands when
running the command compgen -bakc| wc -l. That includes all bash built-ins, reserved keywords,
aliases and custom commands found in $PATH. In fact the built-ins commands in a Linux system is not too
many, maybe around 160 commands - to the best of our knowledge.
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Table 5.1: Eight topics and their representative keywords detected by LDA model.
and its parameters like +x, 777 to make a file executable. Topic 8 touches the history
with some actions to remove history log file or delete an environment variable controlling
the history file size. And so on and so forth.
5.2 Proposed Risk Level Estimation
Based on the observations on the clusters of commands and the summary of top frequent
commands in our dataset, we propose a simple way to estimate the risk level of the com-
mands as following:
• Consider a small subset of related Linux commands at a time, for example, the
group of network related commands or file permission related commands, etc.
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• Within each group, we assign relatively a similar risk level for the similar or closely-
related commands. For example, if we assign a risk level of 2 to wget command,
we should assign the same risk level to curl command since these two command
can be used to achieve a similar task and can be an alternative of each other.
• The risk level assigned to each command does not need to be perfect. The most
important property of the estimated risk level is its consistency. As explained be-
fore, the similar commands should have similar risk level. It is easy to manu-
ally check this property, for example, the commands less, more, head, tail
should have the same risk level no matter what way to estimate them. The estimated
risk level should also be logic. For example, in the same group of user-related com-
mands, the command who (for displaying who are logged-in) should be less risky
than the command userdel (for deleting an user in the system).
In that way, we end up with the following proposed groups of closely related basic
Linux commands and their estimated risk level: 3
• Basic commands related to file and directory manipulation and simple text edition
(Table 5.2).
• Hardware information related commands (Table 5.3).
• System information related commands (Table 5.4).
• User information related commands (Table 5.5).
• Access control, remote control, file permission and environment variable related
commands (Table 5.6).
• Process/Service/Daemon related commands (Table 5.7).
• Network related commands (Table 5.8).
More over, after progressively modifying the above groups multiple times, we found
that we can add several simple heuristics to identify a risky command.
3The important point to keep in mind is that, the proposed risk level estimation is not perfect, it is
subjective, it may have many controversial points. All of these defects come from the limited knowledge of
mine own. However it can be modified and improved easily thanks to the programmatic labeling approach
(which is presented in the next section).
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Command Short Description Risk Level
cd Change director R0
echo Display input text/string R0
ls list files R0
pwd Print working directory R0
wc Show number of words, lines R0
awk Manipulate text file, e.g. text parsing R1
cp Copy files/directories R1
grep Search for specific pattern in a file R1
gzip Compress .gz file R1
head Show first n lines R1
less Show content R1
ln Create symbolic link R1
locate Find (files and directories) for a given name R1
more Show content R1
mkdir Create directory R1
mv Rename file R1
sed Edit text file R1
scp Secure copy R1
tail Show last n lines R1
tar Compress/decompress files R1
touch Create new file R1
cat Append to file R2
make Utility to help compile source files R2
mount Mount a device or remote directory R2
vi Create/edit text file R2
rm Remove file R4
rm -rf Recursively remove a directory (no confirm) R4
Table 5.2: Basic commands and their estimated risk level.
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Command Short Description Risk Level
free Display free and used memory R1
hdparm disk data information R1
lsblk Show information about block devices R1
lshw List hardware configuration information R1
lspci Show PCI devices R1
lsusb Show USB devices R1
dmidecode Show hardware information from the BIOS R2
dmesg Show bootup messages R2
df Show disk info (free and used space) R2
du Show disk usage R2
fdisk Show/modify disk partitions R3
Table 5.3: Hardware information related commands and their estimated risk level.
Command Short Description Risk Level
date Show current date/time R0
hostname Show system hostname R0
uname Show system information or kernel info R0
uptime Display how long the system has been running R0
lsof List of all open files (resources) on the system R3
timedatectl Change system clock R3
Table 5.4: System information related commands and their estimated risk level.
• A command that is too long (more than 80 characters).
• A command using mysterious base64 string.
• A command that modifies history, e.g., remove all history (history -c) or disable
history(set +o history or unset HISTFILE).
• A command that modifies system packages (install/uninstall), e.g., apt-get install
or make install.
• A command that controls firewall service or modifies firewall configuration/rules.
• A command that disables/stops a services, e.g., systemctl stop firewalld or
systemctl disable firewalld.
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Command Short Description Risk Level
id Show details of active users R1
last Show last system login R1
w Show result of who and uptime commands R1
who Show list of logged-in users R1
whoami Show who you are logged-in as R1
adduser Add new user R3
groupadd Add new group R3
chpasswd Update passwords (for a list of users in the system) R4
passwd Set/change password for one user R4
userdel Delete user R4
usermod Modify properties of user (e.g. change group) R4
Table 5.5: User information related commands and their estimated risk level.
Command Short Description Risk Level
chmod Change file permission R2
chmod +x Make file executable R2
chmod 777 Assign full permission to everyone R2
chown Change file ownership R2
ssh Connect to remote host R3
telnet Connect via telnet R3
su switch user R4
sudo Use root privileges R4
chattr Change attribute of a file R4
set Change system environment variables, e.g. $PATH R4
unset Delete env. variables R4
source Make the changed env. variables take effect R4
EXPORT Make env. variables available (e.g. be exported to child-
processes)
R4
Table 5.6: Access control, remote access, file permission and environment variables re-
lated commands and their estimated risk level.
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Command Short Description Risk Level
htop Show running processes R1
top Show running processes R1
ps Show running processes R1
kill Kill process by id R4
killall Kill process (and child processes) by labelled name R4
pkill Kill process by name R4
service Control daemon, e.g. service name [start/stop/restart]R4
systemctl Control system process R4
Table 5.7: Process/Service/Daemon related commands and their estimated risk level.
Command Short Description Risk Level
wget Download file R2
curl Download file R2
ifconfig Display all network interfaces R3
netstat Scan active listening ports R3
dig Show DNS information R3
host Show IP lookup of a domain (like IP address) R3
hostname Show local IP address R3
tcpdump Capture packages on an interface R4
Table 5.8: Network related commands and their estimated risk level.
• A command containing sensitive keywords like ”hack”, ”hacked”, ”hacking”, ”anony-
mous”, etc.
• A command to execute a shell, python, perl script (e.g., bash, sh, python, perl).
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5.3 Construction of a Labeling-Model
The groups of related Linux commands defined above and the ensemble of heuristics give
us the essential keywords and rules to estimate the risk level. The question now is how to
transfer this prior knowledge into the label for the real dataset without manually labeling
each command. The solution is Snorkel [28]4, a system for programmatically building and
managing training datasets. Instead of hand-labeling the data, we will write the labeling
functions to express our constraints. For example, given a rule saying that, a command
to download an external script from the internet is assigned a risk level of 2/4, a corre-
sponding labeling function (written in Python using snorkel package [31]) is as follows.
Example of Labeling Function
from snorkel.labeling import labeling_function
@labeling_function()
def lf_download(cmd):
black_list = ["wget", "curl"]
return R2 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split())
else UNKNOWN
In this example, the risk level 2/4 is defined by R2 constant, and the UNKNOWN will be
assigned to the command if it does not contain any of two keywords wget, curl. From
the given labeling functions, snorkel construct a Labeling Model that learns from defined
rules and heuristics to automatically assign label (the estimated risk level) to the unla-
beled data. In theory, the Labeling Model can learn the combination of different labeling
functions. It constructs a complicate probabilistic model to predict the label probability of
a data point given different labeling functions [29]. In the language modeling tasks like
sentiment analysis for example, a sentence can be assigned different emotional nuances
and the model will learn the weight of different emotions in order to determine the final
score [10]. On the contrary, our task is to assign one risk level for each command. The
risk level is not a categorical variable (no natural ordering among the categories), but it is
4https://www.snorkel.org/
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an ordinal variable instead (the order matters). A custom deterministic Labeling Model is
created to adapt with our task. It simply assigns the highest risk level among all the risk
levels assigned by different labeling function for a given command.
For example the command
echo IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKZWNobyAiSGVsbG8gV29ybGQhIg== | base64 --decode | bash
will be assigned a risk level 3, which is the highest one assigned by:
• the labeling function related to the basic command group (echo - risk level 0),
• the heuristic related to base64 string (risk level 3),
• the heuristic related to executing a command (with bash - risk level 3),
• the heuristic related to the long command (risk level 2).
A complete list of 30 labeling functions that encode the proposed estimation for the groups of
commands is presented in Table 5.2 to Table 5.8 and the additional heuristics are detailed in the
supplementary material at the end of this thesis. It should note that, the labeling functions do not
need to be perfectly accurate [30]. They can correlated with other labeling function, or can even
overlap or conflict with others. And thus command in the dataset can be labeled by one or more
labeling function or even by no labeling function.
The proposed keywords and heuristics are types of weak supervision information. When the
full labels for the entire data is not provided, we can still use the labeling function to represent
the domain knowledge (about the Linux commands) in the form of noisy, programmatic rules and
heuristics. This approach is different to the traditional rule-based approach. In the rule-based
methods, the set of fixed rules must be defined in advance and we are not allowed to have the
conflict rules. Also in these methods, the order of the defined rules matter. When the number of
rule increases, we have to make more efforts to manage the rules to satisfy the order constraints
and to avoid conflicts. With programmatic approach provided by snorkel, the rules can be very
simple and easy to combine, that makes the maintenance easier.
These 30 functions are summary in the Fig. 5.2. The coverage metric indicates how a labeling
function covers the entries of the dataset. This metric is counted when one data point is labeled
by at least one labeling function. The coverage of all labeling function do not sum to one since
one data point can be covered by more than one labeling functions. If one data point is labeled by
more than one labeling function (maybe with the same or with different labels), it will count for
the overlap metric. When a data point is labeled differently by two labeling function, it will count
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Labeling Function Name Estimated Risk Level Coverage Overlaps Conflicts
1 basic_cmds_g1 [0] 33.88% 19.30% 19.30%
2 basic_cmds_g2 [1] 30.14% 28.28% 19.14%
3 basic_cmds_g3 [2] 19.66% 19.15% 19.15%
4 basic_cmds_g4 [4] 3.58% 0.00% 0.00%
5 hardware_info_g1 [1] 10.33% 9.19% 0.06%
6 hardware_info_g2 [2] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7 hardware_info_g3 [] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
8 system_info_g1 [0] 15.14% 0.06% 0.06%
9 system_info_g2 [] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
10 user_info_g1 [1] 4.57% 0.00% 0.00%
11 user_info_g2 [] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
12 user_info_g3 [4] 5.77% 5.77% 5.77%
13 file_permission [2] 0.35% 0.02% 0.00%
14 remote_access [] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
15 access_control [4] 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
16 env_variable [4] 3.70% 0.93% 0.00%
17 process_g1 [1] 4.62% 0.02% 0.00%
18 process_g2 [4] 0.06% 0.05% 0.04%
19 network_g1 [2] 0.40% 0.14% 0.01%
20 network_g2 [3] 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
21 network_g3 [] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
22 lf_long_cmd [2] 0.22% 0.22% 0.10%
23 lf_base64 [3] 0.61% 0.61% 0.42%
24 lf_history [4] 1.86% 0.93% 0.00%
25 lf_install [3] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
26 lf_schedue [3] 4.55% 0.00% 0.00%
27 lf_firewall [4] 0.02% 0.02% 0.00%
28 lf_disable_services [4] 0.03% 0.02% 0.00%
29 lf_sensitive_keywords [4] 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
30 lf_execute [3] 5.83% 5.23% 5.04%
Figure 5.2: Summary of the defined labeling functions. These labeling functions are
shown by their name, following by three metrics. The most important metric is the cov-
erage, that measures how do the labeling function cover the unlabeled data.
for the conflict metric. This is a big advantage of snorkel that allows the user to freely define the
flexible labeling functions without worrying about the hard constraints of rule conflicts.
Fig. 5.2 shows that, most of the commands in our dataset come from the group of basic com-
mand. However, it should consider all other labeling functions of other groups to make sure that
we can cover as much as possible the commands in our dataset. The labeling process is very
quick, it take around 1.5 minutes to label around 700K commands. Therefore, we can progres-
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sively change the keywords, the proposed estimation of risk level and improve the labeling func-
tions. Fig. 5.3 shows a histogram of the number of command for each estimated risk level. That
gives the first insight of the distribution of the class labels which can be helpful when building a
multi-class classification model.
The most important point to keep in mind that, the performance of the downstream classifica-
tion model does not depend on the labels, but it depends on the representation of the input data
and the model itself. In our work, when we have only unlabeled data, the proposed solution of
applying Labeling Model helps us encode the prior knowledge (from Table 5.2 to Table 5.8) into our
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Histogram of number commands for each risk level
Figure 5.3: Histogram showing the number of command for each estimated risk level.
5.4 Classification of Commands by Estimated Risk Levels
We assume that the estimated risk levels provided by the Labeling Model are reliable enough to
use as class labels for our dataset. In order to build a multi-class classification model to classify the
command by the estimate risk level, we follow the same pipeline defined in the Chapter 4. From
694, 643 commands in the honeypot logs, 70% of them are used for the training set and 30% of
them are reserved for the test set. Firstly, the text data need to be transformed into numerical vec-
tors. We compare two representation models: a simple Bag-Of-Word model and a more powerful
Doc2Vec model. These two models are trained only using the corpus in the training set. For the
first model, the training and test data are then represented by the Count-Vector. For the second
model, the data are represented by the output embedding of the Doc2Vec model. Secondly, we
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train a Logistic Regression model5 with the extracted features produced by these two represen-
tation models. We use the Logistic Regression model implement in scikit-learn [24] and tune the
C parameter (which control the regularization) and the solver (which determine the strategy of
for multi-class classification). The best hyper-parameters found by cross validation and the high-
lighted classification results are reported in the Table 5.9. The chosen liblinear solver [8] makes
the Logistic Regression model faster in training phase and also in prediction, that is suitable for
real-time prediction in the real system.
Embedding vector size Classification model Accuracy
Model 1 count-vector(128) LogisticRegression
(C = 1e−3, solver = ”liblinear”)
95.05%
Model 2 Doc2Vec(128) 99.58%
Table 5.9: Tuned hyper-parameters for representation and classification models. The clas-
sification accuracy on the test set can be greatly improved when using the Doc2Vec model.
Figure 5.4: Multi-class classification using count-vector as input features.
5It should not confuse this model with other one of similar name: Linear Regression is a regression
model used to predict real output value. Logistic Regression is a linear (multi-class) classification model.
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Figure 5.5: Multi-class classification using Doc2Vec features.
In order to evaluate the performance of the classification model, we measure the accuracy of
the prediction result and analyze the confusion matrix on the test set. The confusion matrices
are detailed in Fig. 5.4 (for the model using Bag-of-Word features) and in Fig. 5.5 (for the model
using Doc2Vec embedding). It is clear that, by using a better representation, the accuracy of the
classification model can be greatly improved. Moreover, the False Negative and False Positive error
in total are reduced.
The quantitative metrics can be useful for comparing the different models. It can be more
helpful to see how the predictive model works with the real input commands. Some examples of
input commands and the result if we run these commands in a Linux machine are shown in the
Listing Demo Input Commands. The following prediction is obtained from the Model 1 (using simple
count-vector features of a Bag-of-Word model + Logistic Regression).6 The prediction result is
shown in Fig. 5.6. It is consistent with the rules defined in Table 5.2, Table 5.8, Table 5.6 and the
heuristic of executing a bash script.
6The pipeline of Model 1 is faster than Model 2 since the Model 2 takes more time to build the Doc2Vec




Linux xlap2 4.15.0-34-generic #37-Ubuntu SMP Mon Aug 27 15:21:48 UTC 2018





Resolving pastebin.com (pastebin.com)... 104.23.99.190, 104.23.98.190
Connecting to pastebin.com (pastebin.com)|104.23.99.190|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/plain]
Saving to: ‘suLEviDH’
suLEviDH [ <=> ] 89 --.-KB/s in 0s
2020-08-14 13:58:27 (3,15 MB/s) - ‘suLEviDH’ saved [89]
$more suLEviDH
#!/bin/bash










chmod +x suLEviDH R2
bash suLEviDH R3
rm -rf ../temp R4
Figure 5.6: Demonstration of model prediction for user input commands.
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Summary Chapter Classification of the Commands in SSH Session by Risk Levels
In this chapter, we deal with a multi-class classification problem. Each command is now
classified by different risk level. The risk level of each Linux command is not well defined
since it depends on the usage context. It also requires domain experts’ knowledge to be
correctly evaluated in different situation.
Classifying a large, unlabeled dataset (of more than 900K commands) is challenging. We
propose the following pipeline to solve this problem.
{UNLABELED honeypots logs} −→ Exploratory Data Analysis −→ Proposed Keywords
and Heuristics −→ Labeling Functions −→ {LABELED text commands} −→ Doc2Vec −→
Logistic Regression model.
The most important contribution in this chapter is our labeling functions.
• We start by observing the top frequent commands in the honeypot logs and the dif-
ferent groups of commands provided by a topic modeling model.
• We propose coherent and consistent keywords and heuristics that can help us to as-
sign risk level for a given command.
• We then write down an ensemble of labeling functions using snorkel library to
encode our heuristics.
• Thanks to these labeling functions, we construct a noisy-but-consistent LabelModel
which will assigns an estimated risk level for each command in our large, unlabelled
dataset.
This automatic and programmatic way to encode prior knowledge gives us a reliable anno-
tated dataset. We construct a dataset of 6 classes: 5 classes of increasing risk level from R0
to R4 and one class UNKNOWN for the error commands or the commands not covered by
our LabelModel. We use Logistic Regression model which outputs 6 scores for each input
command, that help determine risk level in an intuitive way. Finally we obtain an accuracy




In the context of a smart honeypot, we propose a complete workflow to solve the problem of
classifying the Linux commands in a SSH session by multiple risk levels. Beside the target of a
high accuracy, low False Negative and False Positive error of the prediction results, we also consider
other non-functional requirements in Sec. 6.1. We also discuss briefly what we have done and
what we should improve in Sec. 6.2
6.1 Discussion
The first non-functional requirement in our system is the the response time. The predictive model
is a part of a decision marker inside the Smart Proxy in a Honeypot. It is required to make pre-
diction with high accuracy and extreme low response time since the honeypot has to return the
result in (nearly) real-time. This requirement depends on the classification model. For that reason,
the linear SVM model and Logistic Regression model are chosen since they do not have too many
hyper-parameters to tune (like a Neural Network trained by Stochastic Gradient Descent) and the
training and testing phrases are very fast. 1
The second non-functional requirement that we care about is the explainability. In the multi-
class classification task, we apply the Labeling Model to automatically assign labels for our dataset.
The prediction performance of the system does not depend on how we label the data. However to
understand how the Labeling Model works and evaluate the quality of the assigned labels, we need
1The implementation of these two models in scikit-learn use LIBLINEAR, a fast and high efficient library
for large dataset [8]. (https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/c̃jlin/liblinear/, https://github.com/cjlin1/liblinear).
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to analyze this model. The interpretability of a complex model is important [17]. We need to know
the explanation for the prediction of the model. For example, we can ask: Why does the Labeling
Model assign such label to a given command? One simple way to do that is to investigate what are
the labeling functions that process a given command. Fig. 6.1 shows an example of several com-
mands which are processed by multiple labeling functions. The Involved Labeling Functions column
shows a list of labeling functions (detailed in the appendix) that process the given command and
the corresponding risk level. By observing this type of explanation, we can find out the labeling
functions that do not work as expected, update them in order to improve the Labeling Model.
Commands Involved Labeling Functions








dmidecode | grep vendor | head -n 1
basic_cmds_g2 [1]
hardware_info_g2 [2]
processid=$(ps -u | grep -v _STRING_ | 




Figure 6.1: Analyzing the explainability of the Labeling Model: what are the labeling func-
tions that process a given command?
The third non-functional requirement of our system is the ability of maintenance. A good pre-
dictive model should generalize well (predict for unseen data). We train the predictive model on a
specific set of data collected in the past. These data are processed by two models in our workflow:
the Labeling Model for automatically assigning labels and the classification model for prediction
task. When the new data come and the predictive model does not perform well, we should up-
date the system to learn from these data. One simple strategy is to re-train these two models. In
our case, this strategy is feasible since the models are not too large. By design, updating the La-
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beling Model is easy: we can simply add new labeling functions to express the new rules or new
heuristics, re-train and test the new Labeling Model to obtain the new set of labels. Since the label-
ing functions are allowed to be conflicted or overlapped, adding new functions does not affect the
old ones. That make the maintenance easy and manageable since we do not have to deal with te-
dious tasks of managing the dependency, order, priority or conflict among the labeling functions.
In contrast, updating the classification model is more difficult. We need some algorithms that can
learn incrementally: i.e. learn from new training examples (that is called online learning or incremen-
tal learning). The proposed linear classification models (linear SVM and Logistic Regression) can
be adapted for online learning by using the optimization procedure based on stochastic gradient
descent (SGD). Since the SGD learns from the mini-batches, we can continue to train the old model
with the new mini-batches containing the new data. 2
6.2 Conclusion and Future Work
Applying machine learning to a specific problem is challenging. Our problem is to classify the
commands in the SSH session by multiple risk levels. We solve this problem by starting with the
simple case of binary classification and then go to the more general case of multi-class classifica-
tion. Four research questions are proposed to guide our work to focus on four important steps
in the workflow: (i) data collection and labeling, (ii) data transformation, (iii) model construction,
(iv) evaluation and interpretation of the predicted results. We obtain the good results for both
tasks. All of our results are reproducible. 3
However, there are several points that can be improved in this work. First, we can collect more
diverse data which capture more attacking scenarios. Second, the data representation step may
also be improved using the modern Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) or the Long Short Term
Memory (LSTM) model to learn more powerful representation. Third, we should consider the on-
line learning algorithm in order to update the predictive model with new data. Fourth, we can set
weights for the groups of commands presented in Sec. 5.2 according to different requirements. For
example, in the web servers the group of network related commands may have higher weights,
2scikit-learn support SGDClassification for online learning:
https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.linear model.SGDClassifier.html
3All of our analyses can be found in this link: https://www.kaggle.com/thuyngandao/bashlogs
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while in the storage servers the group of commands related to file manipulation may have higher
weights.
The last and most important point to improve is in the process of automatic data labeling.
From the conceptual aspect, we propose to categorize the Linux commands into groups of related
commands. The similar commands in each groups are assigned similar risk levels in order to make
sure that the risk levels are relatively coherent. From the practical aspect, the proposed risk levels
for each command is encoded into the dataset via the Labeling Model. But, we have not yet tackled
the problem of evaluating the quality of the automatic labels. Human assessment is needed to
verify the predicted labels or to debug the Labeling Model (as shown in Fig. 6.1). Another efficient
way to do this is to collect a small set of hand-labeled data from experts in the domain, called the
ground-truth. Data in the ground-truth will be passed through the Labeling Model. By evaluating
the predicted labels and the ground-truth labels, we can improve Labeling Model.
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Supplementary material: Labeling Functions
DAO Thuy Ngan
Definition of different groups of command with estimated risk level.
First, we define the labeling function based on analyzed keywords.
keyword_labeling_func_config = {
# basic command
"basic_cmds_g1": (R0, ["cd", "pwd", "ls", "wc", "echo", "which"]),
"basic_cmds_g2": (
R1, ["grep", "locate", "mkdir", "cp", "scp", "mv", "ln",
"touch", "more", "less", "head", "tail", "tar", "gzip",
"awk", "sed"]),
"basic_cmds_g3": (R2, ["vi", "cat", "make", "mount"]),
"basic_cmds_g4": ( R4, ["rm", "-rf"]),
# hardware information related commands
"hardware_info_g1": (R1, ["free", "lshw", "lsblk", "lspci", "lsusb", "lscpu", "nproc", "hdparm"]),
"hardware_info_g2": (R2, ["dmesg", "dmidecode", "df", "du"]),
"hardware_info_g3": (R3, ["fdisk"]),
# system information related commands
"system_info_g1": (R0, ["uname", "uptime", "date", "hostname", "cal"]),
"system_info_g2": (R3, ["lsof", "timedatectl"]),
# user information related commands
"user_info_g1": (R1, ["w", "who", "whoami", "id", "last"]),
"user_info_g2": (R3, ["adduser", "groupadd"]),
"user_info_g3": (R4, ["usermod", "userdel", "passwd", "chpasswd"]),
1
# access control, remote access, file permission related commands
"file_permission": (R2, ["chmod", "chown", "+x", "777"]),
"remote_access": (R3, ["ssh", "telent"]),
"access_control": (R4, ["sudo", "su", "chattr"]),
# change system envirionment variables
"env_variable": (R4, ["set", "unset", "source", "export"]),
# process related commands
"process_g1": (R1, ["ps", "top", "htop"]),
"process_g2": (R4, ["kill", "pkill", "killall", "service", "systemctl"]),
# network related commands
"network_g1": (R2, ["wget", "curl", "ip"]),
"network_g2": (R3, ["ifconfig", "netstat", "dig", "host", "hostname"]),
"network_g3": (R4, ["tcpdump"]),
}
The constants R0, ..., R4 in the code above denote different risk level and are defined simply as
UNKNOWN = -1
R0, R1, R2, R3, R4 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
Morover, we define the labeling functions based on heuristics:
We use several additional heuristics to indicate the malicious commands.
• A command that are too long (e.g., having more than 80 characters).
• A command using mysterious base64 string. (See example above, the base64 string is a bash script that
simply echos “Hello World!”. When this string is decoded, it can be executed by piping the decoded
script to bash.)
• A command that modifies history, e.g., remove all history disable history unset HISTFILE (do not
remember input commands).
• A command that modifies system packages (install/uninstall), e.g., apt-get install or event make
install.
2
• A command that controls firewall service or modifies firewall config/rules.
• A command that disables/stops a services, e.g., systemctl stop firewalld or systemctl disable
firewalld
• A command containing sensitive keywords like “hack”, “hacked”, “hacking”, “anonymous”, etc.
• A command to execute a script (bash, python, perl script, etc).
from snorkel.labeling import labeling_function
@labeling_function()
def lf_long_cmd(cmd):
# Assign some risk level to a too-long command
return R2 if len(cmd) > 80 else UNKNOWN
@labeling_function()
def lf_base64(cmd):
# Using mysterious base64 string
black_list = ["base64", "--decode"]




black_list = ["history", "histfile", "histsize", "histfilesize"]
return R4 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split()) else UNKNOWN
@labeling_function()
def lf_install(cmd):
# Modify system package (install, uninstall)
black_list = ["install", "uninstall", "yum", "apt-get", "snap"]
return R3 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split()) else UNKNOWN
@labeling_function()
def lf_schedue(cmd):
# Automatically schedule jobs
black_list = ["crontab"]
return R3 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split()) else UNKNOWN
@labeling_function()
def lf_firewall(cmd):
# Control firewall service or modify firewall config/rules
black_list = ["firewall", "firewalld", "iptables"]
return R4 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split()) else UNKNOWN
@labeling_function()
def lf_disable_services(cmd):
# Disable/Stop services, e.g. `systemctl stop firewalld` or `systemctl disable firewalld`
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black_list = ["disable", "stop"]
return R4 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split()) else UNKNOWN
@labeling_function()
def lf_sensitive_keywords(cmd):
# Sensitive keywords like "hacked", "anonymous"
black_list = ["anonymous", "hack", "hacked", "hacking"]
return R4 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split()) else UNKNOWN
@labeling_function()
def lf_execute(cmd):
# Execute script (e.g., bash or python or perl script)
black_list = ["./", "._PATH_", "bash", "sh", "perl", "python", "python3"]
return R3 if any(token in black_list for token in cmd.split()) else UNKNOWN
Construction of labeling function using snorkel
from snorkel.labeling import LabelingFunction
def keyword_lookup(cmd, keywords, label):
if any(word in cmd.lower() for word in keywords):
return label
return UNKNOWN






Create labeling functions and apply them to the given unlabeld dataset
# Create a list of all labeling functions based on keywords
labeling_functions = [
make_keyword_lf(f_name=f_name, keywords=keywords, label=label)
for f_name, (label, keywords) in keyword_labeling_func_config.items()
]













# Apply these labeling functions to the unlabeled dataset
from snorkel.labeling import LFApplier
applier = LFApplier(lfs=labeling_functions)
L_train = applier.apply(np.array(cmds_flat))
# ==> `694643it [01:16, 9102.28it/s]`
# Generalte a table to analyze the coverage of each defined labeling function
from snorkel.labeling import LFAnalysis
LFAnalysis(L=L_train, lfs=labeling_functions).lf_summary()
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